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ABSTRACT
Differential privacy (DP) has emerged as a de facto standard privacy
notion for a wide range of applications. Since the meaning of data
utility in different applications may vastly differ, a key challenge is
to find the optimal randomization mechanism, i.e., the distribution
and its parameters, for a given utility metric. Existing works have
identified the optimal distributions in some special cases, while
leaving all other utility metrics (e.g., usefulness and graph distance)
as open problems. Since existing works mostly rely on manual anal-
ysis to examine the search space of all distributions, it would be
an expensive process to repeat such efforts for each utility metric.
To address such deficiency, we propose a novel approach that can
automatically optimize different utility metrics found in diverse
applications under a common framework. Our key idea that, by
regarding the variance of the injected noise itself as a random vari-
able, a two-fold distribution may approximately cover the search
space of all distributions. Therefore, we can automatically find dis-
tributions in this search space to optimize different utility metrics
in a similar manner, simply by optimizing the parameters of the
two-fold distribution. Specifically, we define a universal framework,
namely, randomizing the randomization mechanism of differential
privacy (R2DP), and we formally analyze its privacy and utility. Our
experiments show that R2DP can provide better results than the
baseline distribution (Laplace) for several utility metrics with no
known optimal distributions, whereas our results asymptotically
approach to the optimality for utility metrics having known optimal
distributions. As a side benefit, the added degree of freedom intro-
duced by the two-fold distribution allows R2DP to accommodate
the preferences of both data owners and recipients.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Significant amounts of individual information are being collected
and analyzed today through a wide variety of applications across
Appears in Proceedings of the 27th ACM Conference on Computer and
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different industries [2]. Differential privacy has been widely recog-
nized as the de facto standard notion [20, 23] in protecting individ-
uals’ privacy during such data collection and analysis. On the other
hand, since the privacy constraints (e.g., the degree of random-
ization) imposed by differential privacy may render the released
data less useful for analysis, the fundamental trade-off between
privacy and utility (i.e., analysis accuracy) has attracted significant
attention in various settings [23, 25, 28, 54, 64, 67].
In this context, a key issue is to identify the optimal randomiza-
tion mechanisms (i.e., distributions and their parameters) [4, 10, 31–
33, 35, 38, 41]). While optimizing the parameters of a given distribu-
tion can be easily automated, identifying the optimal distribution for
different utility metrics is more challenging, and typically requires
manual analysis to examine the search space of all distributions.
In fact, recent studies [4, 10, 31–33, 35, 38, 41] have only identified
the optimal randomization mechanisms for a limited number of
cases with specific utility metrics and queries. For instance, Ghosh
et al. [35, 38] showed that an optimal randomization mechanism
(adding a specific class of geometric noise) can be used to preserve
differential privacy under the class of negative expected loss utility
metrics for a single counting query. Subsequently, Geng et al. [33]
showed that, under the ℓ1 and ℓ2 norms, the widely used standard
Laplace mechanism is asymptotically optimal as ϵ → 0, whereas the
Staircase mechanism (which can be viewed as a geometric mixture
of uniform probability distributions) performs exponentially better
than the Laplace mechanism in case of weaker privacy guarantees
(a comprehensive literature review will be given in Section 6).
However, this has left the optimal distributions of many other
utility metrics as open problems, e.g., usefulness (for machine learn-
ing applications [7]), entropy-based measures (for signal processing
applications [17, 74], and semi-supervised learning [37]), and graph
distance metrics (for social network applications [49]). As shown
in the works of Ghosh et al. [35, 38] and Geng et al. [33], different
utility metrics will likely lead to different optimal distributions.
Moreover, since those existing works mostly rely on manual anal-
ysis to examine the search space of all distributions, it would be
an expensive process to repeat such efforts for each utility metric.
Consequently, many existing works simply employ a well-known
distribution (e.g., Laplace noise with constant scale parameter or
Gaussian noise with constant variance) without worrying about
its optimality. Unfortunately, as our experimental results will show
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(Section 5), choosing a non-optimal distribution (even with its pa-
rameters optimized) may lead to rather poor utility.
1
1
Figure 1: R2DP can automatically optimize different utility
metrics which have no known optimal distributions.
1.1 R2DP: A Universal Framework
Our key observation is the following. To build a universal frame-
work that can automatically find the optimal distribution in the
search space of all distributions, we would need a formulation to
link the differential privacy guarantee to the parameters of differ-
ent distributions (e.g., in Laplace mechanism, ϵ is proportionally
related to the inverse of variance). However, it is a known fact that
such a formulation varies for each distribution, which explains why
existing works have to rely on manual efforts to cover the search
space of all distributions, and it also becomes the main obstacle
to finding a universal solution that works for all utility metrics
employed in different applications.
As depicted in Figure 1, our key idea is that, although it is not
possible to directly cover the search space of all distributions in an
automated fashion, we can indirectly do so based on the following
known fact in probability theory, i.e., a two-fold randomization over
the exponential class of distributions may yield many other distribu-
tions to approximately cover the search space [16]. Since this class
of distributions are all originated from one of the exponential fam-
ily distributions, their differential privacy guarantee will become a
unique function of the parameters of the second fold distribution.
Therefore, these parameters can be used to automatically optimize
utility w.r.t. different utility metrics through a universal framework,
namely, randomizing the randomization mechanism in differential
privacy (R2DP). Furthermore, the two-fold distribution introduces
an added degree of freedom, which allows R2DP to incorporate the
requirements of both data owners and data recipients.
1.2 Contributions
Specifically, we make the following contributions:
(1) We define the R2DP framework with several unique benefits.
First, it provides the first universal solution that is applicable
to different utility metrics, which makes it an appealing so-
lution for applications whose utility metrics have no known
optimal distributions (e.g., [7, 17, 49, 74]). Second, unlike
most existing works which rely on manual analysis [35, 38],
R2DP can automatically identify a distribution that yields
near-optimal utility, and hence ismore practical for emerging
applications. Third, R2DP can incorporate the requirements
of both data owners and data recipients, which addresses a
practical limitation of most existing approaches, i.e., only the
privacy budget ϵ is considered in designing the differentially
private mechanisms.
(2) We formally benchmark R2DPunder thewell-studied Laplace
mechanism. We tackle several key challenges related to the
two-fold distribution in R2DP. We then show that this mech-
anism yields a class of log-convex distributions for which the
differential privacy guarantee can globally be given in terms
of the PDFs’ parameters. We also show that it can generate
near-optimal results w.r.t. a variety of utility metrics whose
optimality is known, e.g., Staircase-shape distribution for
large ϵ and Laplace itself for small ϵ [33].
(3) We evaluate R2DP using six different utility metrics, both
numerically and experimentally on real data, using both sta-
tistical queries (e.g., count and average), and data analytics
applications (e.g., machine learning and social network). The
experimental results demonstrate that R2DP can significantly
increase the utility for those utility metrics with no known
optimal distributions (compared to the baseline Laplace dis-
tribution). We also evaluate the optimality of R2DP using
utility metrics whose optimal distributions are known (e.g.,
Staircase-shape for ℓ1 and ℓ2 norms [33]) and our results
confirm that R2DP can generate near-optimal results.
(4) We discuss the potential of adapting R2DP to improve a
variety of other applications related to differential privacy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
some related background. Section 3 defines the R2DP framework.
Section 4 formally studies the differential privacy guarantee and
the utility of R2DP. Section 5 presents the experiments. Section 6
reviews the related work, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 PRELIMINARIES
We review some background on differential privacy for the theoret-
ical foundations of the R2DP framework.
2.1 Differential Privacy
We follow the standard definitions of ϵ-differential privacy [25, 64].
Let D be a dataset of interest and d , d ′ be two adjacent subsets
of D meaning that we can obtain d ′ from d simply by adding or
subtracting the data of one individual. A randomization mechanism
M : D × Ω → R which is ϵ-differentially private, necessarily
randomizes its output in such a way that for all S ⊂ R,
P(M(d) ∈ S) ≤ eϵP(M(d ′) ∈ S) (1)
If the inequality fails, then a leakage (ϵ breach) takes place, which
means the difference between the prior distribution and posterior
one is tangible. We recall below a basic mechanism that can be used
to answer queries in an ϵ-differentially private way. We will only
be concerned with queries that return numerical answers, i.e., a
query is a mapping q : D → R, where R is a set of real numbers.
The following sensitivity concept plays an important role in the
design of differentially private mechanisms [23].
Definition 2.1. The sensitivity of a query q : D→ R is defined
as ∆q = maxd,d ′:Adj(d,d ′) |q(d) − q(d ′)| [25, 64].
2.2 Laplace Mechanism
The Laplace mechanism [23] modifies a numerical query result by
adding zero-mean noise (denoted as Lap(b)) distributed according
to a Laplace distribution with mean zero and scale parameter b. It
has density p(x ;b) = 12b exp(−
|x |
b ) and variance 2b2.
Theorem 2.1. Let q : D → R be a query , ϵ > 0. Then the
mechanismMq : D × Ω → R defined byMq (d) = q(d) +w , with
w ∼ Lap(b), where b ≥ ∆qϵ , is ϵ-differentially private [23].
2.3 Utility Metrics
ℓp Metrics. In penalized regression, “ℓp penalty” refer to penalizing
the ℓp norm of a solution’s vector of parameter values (i.e., the sum
of its absolute values, or its Euclidean length) [69]. In our privacy-
utility setting, the ℓp utility metric is defined as follows.
Definition 2.2. (ℓp ). For a database mechanismMq (D) the ℓp
utility metric is defined as E(|Mq (D) − q(D)|p )1/p .
Usefulness. Following Blum et al. [7], the following utility metric
is commonly used for machine learning.
Definition 2.3. (Usefulness). A mechanismMq is (γ , ζ )-useful
if, with probability 1− ζ , for any dataset d ⊆ D, |Mq (d) −q(d)| ≤ γ .
Theorem 2.2. The Laplace Mechanism is (∆qϵ ln 1ζ , ζ )-useful, or
equivalently, the Laplace Mechanism is (γ , e
−γ
b(ϵ ) )-useful [13].
Mallows Metric. The Mallows metric has been applied for evalu-
ating the private estimation of the degree distribution of a social
network [42]. It is defined to test if two samples are drawn from
the same distribution. Given two random variables X and Y , we
haveMallows(X ,Y ) = 1n
∑n
i=1(|Xi − Yi |p )1/p (similar to p-norm).
Relative Entropy (Rényi Entropy). The relative entropy, also
known as the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, measures the dis-
tance between two probability distributions [17]. Formally, given
two probability distributions p(x) and q(x) over a discrete random
variable x , the relative entropy given by D(p | |q) is defined as fol-
lows: D(p | |q) = ∑x ∈X p(x) log p(x )q(x ) . Further generalization came
from Rényi [36, 68], who introduced an indexed family of gener-
alized information and divergence measures akin to the Shannon
entropy and KL divergence. Rényi introduced the entropy of order
α as Iα (p | |q) = 1α−1 log(
∑
x ∈X p(x)αq(x)1−α ) , α > 0 and α , 1.
3 THE R2DP FRAMEWORK
In this section, we define the R2DP framework and its main building
block which is the Utility-maximized PDF finder.
3.1 Notions and Notations
In probability and statistics, a random variable (RV) that is dis-
tributed according to some parameterized PDFs, with (some of)
the parameters of that PDFs themselves being random variables, is
known as a mixture distribution [16] when the underlying RV is
discrete (or a compound distribution when the RV is continuous).
Compound (or mixture) distributions have been applied in many
contexts in the literature [66] and arise naturally where a statistical
population contains two or more sub-populations.
Definition 3.1. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space and let X be
a RV that is distributed according to some parameterized distribution
f (θ ) ∈ F with an unknown parameter θ that is again distributed
according to some other distribution д. The resulting distribution h is
said to be the distribution that results from compounding f with д,
h(X ) =
∫
R
f (X |θ )д(θ ) dθ (2)
Then for any Borel subset B of R,
P(X ∈ B) =
∫
B
∫
R
f (X |θ )д(θ ) dθdX (3)
In general, we call any differentially private query answering
mechanisms that leverage two-fold probability distribution func-
tions in their randomization, an R2DP mechanism.
Definition 3.2. (R2DPMechanism). LetMq (d,u) = q(d)
⊕
ω(u)
be a mechanism randomizing the answer of a query q using a random
oracle ω(u), where u is the set of parameters (mean, variance, etc.) of
the PDF of ω and
⊕
stands for the corresponding operator. Denote
by F the space of PDFs, we callMq (d,u) an R2DP mechanism if at
least one of the parameters ui ∈ u, (i ≤ |u |) is/are chosen randomly
w.r.t. a specified probability distribution fui ∈ F .
In particular, the R2DP Laplace mechanism will modify the an-
swer to a numerical query by adding zero-mean noise distributed
according to a compound Laplace distribution with the scale pa-
rameter b itself distributed according to some distribution fb .
Example 3.1. Suppose that the scale parameter b in a Laplace
mechanism is randomized as follows:
b =
{
b1 w.p. p,
b2 w.p. 1 − p.
Then, the perturbed result q(D) + Lap(b) is an example R2DP
Laplace mechanism using a Bernoulli distribution.
Definition 3.3. Let q : D→ R be a query and suppose fb ∈ F
is a probability density function of the scale parameter b. Then, the
mechanismMq : D × Ω → R, defined byMq (d,b) = q(d) + Lap(b)
is an R2DP Laplace mechanism that utilizes PDF fb .
3.2 The Framework
As shown in Figure 2, R2DP framework include the following steps.
R2DP Computation:
• Step 1: The data owner specifies the differential privacy
budget ϵ and the data recipient specifies his/her query of
interest together with its required utility metric.
• Step 2: Given the input triplets (ϵ, query,metric), the utility-
maximized PDF computing module computes the provably
optimal probability density function and its parameters for
the variance of the additive noise. For example, in Figure 2,
Data Recipient
 ε-DP  
 q(D)+ω(σ4) 
Data Owner
 Query (q) 
Database D
Baseline DP 
mechanism
R2DP Computation
q(D)
ω(σ4)
DP 
mechanism
σ1
σ2
 σ3
σ5
σ4
1: Initialize
DP(ε), Query (q)
2: Compute the 
utility-maximized PDF 
 3: Sample the variance 
from the chosen PDF
5: Generate utility-maximized 
DP query result
4: Import the variance 
into the DP mechanism
σ4
Figure 2: The high level overview of the R2DP framework.
the PDF computing module returns a lower tail truncated
Gaussian distribution for the specified inputs.
• Step 3: The variance sampler module randomly samples
(w.r.t. the PDF found in Step 2) one standard deviation σi of
the noise to be eventually added.
Baseline DP Randomization:
• Step 4: Next, the computed standard deviation σi is used
to generate a noise ω(σ4) for the baseline DP mechanism,
which is a DP mechanism of exponential order, e.g ., Laplace,
Gaussian and exponential mechanisms.
• Step 5: The computed noise ω(σi ) is added to the query
result q(D) to provide a utility-maximized DP result to the
data recipient.
The most important module of the R2DP framework is the utility-
maximized PDF computing module (Step 2) which will be described
in more details in the following. Furthermore, to make our discus-
sions more concrete, we instantiate the R2DP framework based
on the well studied Laplace mechanism, namely, the R2DP Laplace
mechanism, where other baseline DP mechanisms will be discussed
in Appendix F due to space limitation (from now on, we will simply
refer to the R2DP Laplace mechanism as R2DP). Particularly, we
show that, with a two-fold Laplace distribution, an infinite-size
class of log-convex distributions can be identified. This class of
distributions pertains a differential privacy guarantee which can
globally be given in terms of the PDFs’ parameters, and hence is
automatically optimizable under the differential privacy constraint.
3.3 Computing Utility-Maximized PDF
In Figure 2, to compute the utility-maximized PDF (Step 2), a key
challenge is to establish the search space of automatically opti-
mizable PDFs, from which the utility-maximized PDF is computed.
Ideally, the search space of an R2DP mechanism can be defined as
the collection of all two-fold distributions, e.g., with Laplace and
exponential as the first and second fold distributions, respectively.
However, the key challenge here is that a mixture of distributions
is itself a distribution which does not necessarily provide a global
differential privacy guarantee in terms of the resulting PDFs’ pa-
rameters (automatically optimizable under the differential privacy
constraint). To address this issue, the Moment Generating Function
(MGF) [30] of the second fold distribution could be utilized, e.g.,
given the first fold as Laplace distribution. Specifically, MGF of a
random variable is an alternative specification of its probability
distribution, and hence provides the basis of an alternative route to
analytical results compared with directly using probability density
functions or cumulative distribution functions [30]. In particular,
the MGF of a random variable is a log-convex function of its proba-
bility distribution which can provide a global differential privacy
guarantee [30] (see Theorem 4.1).
Definition 3.4. (Moment Generating Function [30]). Themoment-
generating function of a random variable x isMX (t) := E
[
etX
]
, t ∈
R wherever this expectation exists. The moment-generating function
is the expectation of the random variable etX .
Theorem 3.1. We can write the CDF of the output of an R2DP
mechanism in terms of theMoment Generating Function (MGF) [30]
of the probability distribution f 1
b
, where b is the randomized scale
parameter (see Appendix A and C for the details and the proof).
Thus, for a PDFwith non-negative support (since scale parameter
is always non-negative), the R2DP mechanism outputs another
PDF using the MGF (where CDF is the moment and PDF is its
derivative, as shown in Equation 10 in Appendix C) . Moreover,
since MGF is a bijective function [29], the R2DP mechanism can
in fact generate a search space as large as the space of all PDFs
with non-negative support and an existing MGF. However, the next
challenge is that not all random variables have moment generating
functions (MGFs), e.g., Cauchy distribution [12]. Fortunately, MGFs
possess an appealing composability property between independent
probability distributions [16], which can be used to provide a search
space of all linear combinations of a set of popular distributions
with known MGFs (infinite number of RVs).
Theorem 3.2 (MGF of LinearCombination of RVs). Ifx1, · · · ,xn
are n independent RVs with MGFsMxi (t) = E(etxi ) for i = 1, · · · ,n,
then the MGF of the linear combination Y =
n∑
i=1
aixi is
n∏
i=1
Mxi (ai t).
Consequently, we define the search space of the R2DP mecha-
nism as all possible linear combinations of a set of independent
RVs with existing MGF (Section 4.2.2 will provide more details on
how to choose the set of independent RVs). Although this search
space is only a subset of all two-fold distributions, we will show
through both numerical results (in Section E) and experiments with
real data (Section 5) that this search space is indeed sufficient to
generate near-optimal utility w.r.t. all utility metrics (universality).
4 PRIVACY AND UTILITY
In this section, we analyze the privacy and utility of the R2DP, and
then discuss extensions for improving and implementing R2DP.
4.1 Privacy Analysis
We now show the R2DP mechanism provides differential privacy
guarantee. By Theorem 3.1, the DP bound of the R2DP is
eϵ = max∀S ∈R
{ −M 1
b
(−|x−q(d ) |) |S≥q(d )+M 1b (−|x−q(d ) |) |S<q(d )
−M 1
b
(−|x−q(d ′) |) |S≥q(d′)+M 1b (−|x−q(d
′) |) |S<q(d′)
}
Hence, the value of eϵ only depends on the distribution of re-
ciprocal of the scale parameter b, i.e., f 1
b
. Moreover, an MGF is
positive and log-convex [30] where the latter property is desirable
in defining various natural logarithm upper bounds, e.g., DP bound.
In the following theorem, our MGF-based formula for the proba-
bility P({q(d) + Lap(b)} ∈ S) can be easily applied to calculate the
differential privacy guarantee (see Appendix C for the proof).
Theorem 4.1. The R2DP mechanismMq (d,b) is
ln

E( 1b )
dM 1
b
(t)
dt |t=−∆q

-differentially private. (4)
Moreover, Theorem 3.2 can be directly applied to calculate the
differential privacy guarantee of any RV from the search space
defined in Section 3.3 (i.e., all linear combinations of a set of inde-
pendent RVs with known MGFs).
Corollary 4.2 (Differential Privacy of Combined PDFs).
If x1, · · · ,xn are n independent random variables with respective
MGFsMxi (t) = E(etxi ) for i = 1, · · · ,n, then the R2DP mechanism
Mq (d,b) where 1b is defined as the linear combination 1b =
n∑
i=1
aixi
is ϵ-differentially private, where
ϵ = ln

n∑
j=1
aj · Ex j ( 1b )
n∑
j=1
aj ·M ′x j (−aj · ∆q) ·
n∏
i=1
i,j
Mxi (−ai · ∆q)

(5)
Therefore, we have established a search space of probability
distributions with a universal formulation for their differential
privacy guarantees, which is the key enabler for the universality of
R2DP. Next, we characterize the utility of R2DP mechanisms.
4.2 Utility Analysis
We now characterize the utility of the R2DP mechanism. To make
concrete discussions, we focus on the usefulness metric (see Sec-
tion 2.3), and a similar logic can also be applied to other metrics.
4.2.1 Characterizing the Utility. Denote by U (ϵ,∆q,γ ) the useful-
ness of an R2DP mechanism for all ϵ > 0, sensitivity ∆q and error
bound γ . The optimal usefulness is then given as the answer of the
following optimization problem over the search space of PDFs.
max
f 1
b
∈F
{
U (ϵ,∆q,γ )} = max
f 1
b
∈F
{
1
2 ·
[
−M 1
b
(−|x − q(d)|)|q(d )+γq(d )
+M 1
b
(−|x − q(d)|)|q(d )q(d )−γ
]}
,
subject to ϵ = ln

E( 1b )
dM 1
b
(t)
dt |t=−∆q

where the utility function is the probability of generating ϵ-DP
query results within a distance of γ -error (using Theorem 3.1). Note
that ϵ and ∆q do not directly impact the usefulness but they do so
indirectly through the differential privacy constraint. Furthermore,
as shown in Theorem 4.1, the differential privacy guarantee ϵ over
the established search space is a unique function of the parameters
of the second-fold distribution.
Corollary 4.3. Denote byu, the set of parameters for a probability
distribution f 1
b
, and byMf (u) its MGF. Then, the optimal usefulness
of an R2DP mechanism utilizing f 1
b
, at each triplet (ϵ,∆q,γ ) is
Uf (ϵ,∆q,γ ) = max
u ∈R|u |
{
1
2 ·
[
−Mf (u)(−|x − q(d)|)|q(d )+γq(d )
+Mf (u)(−|x − q(d)|)|q(d )q(d )−γ
]}
,
subject to ϵ = ln

E( 1b )
dM 1
b
(t)
dt |t=−∆q

Since MGFs are positive and log-convex, withM(0) = 1, we have
Uf (ϵ,∆q,γ ) = 1 − min
u ∈R|u |
Mf (u)(−γ ). Thus, for usefulness metric,
the optimal distribution for ϵ is the one with the minimum MGF
evaluated at γ . In particular, for a set of privacy/utility parameters,
we can find the optimal PDF using the Lagrange multiplier [6]. i.e.,
L(u, λ) = Mf (u)(−γ ) + λ · (ln

E( 1b )
dM 1
b
(t)
dt |t=−∆q

− ϵ) (6)
Moreover, Theorem 3.2 can be directly applied to design a utility-
maximizing R2DP mechanism with a sufficiently large search space
(with an infinite number of different random variables).
Corollary 4.4 (Optimal Utility for Combined RVs). If x1,x2,
· · · ,xn are n independent random variables with respective MGFs
Mxi (t) = E(etxi ) for i = 1, 2, · · · ,n, then for the linear combination
Y =
n∑
i=1
aixi , the optimal usefulness (similar relation holds for other
metrics) under ϵ-differential privacy constraint is given as
UY (ϵ,∆q,γ ) = 1 − minA,U
{
n∏
i=1
Mxi (−aiγ )
}
(7)
subject to
ϵ = ln

n∑
j=1
aj · Ex j ( 1b )
n∑
j=1
aj ·M ′x j (aj · −∆q) ·
n∏
i=1
i,j
Mxi (−ai · ∆q)

where A = {a1,a2, · · · ,an } is the set of the coefficients and U =
{u1,u2, · · · ,un } is the set of parameters of the probability distribu-
tions of RVs xi , ∀i ≤ n.
Similar to the case of a single RV, we can compute the optimal
solution for this optimization problem using the Lagrangemultiplier
function in Equation 6.
4.2.2 Finding Utility-Maximizing Distributions. Since not all second-
fold probability distributions can boost the utility of the baseline
Laplace mechanism, leveraging all RVs into our search space would
only result in redundant computation by the utility-maximized PDF
computing module. Accordingly, in this section, we first derive a
necessary condition on the differential privacy guarantee of R2DP
to boost the utility of the baseline Laplace mechanism (refer to
Appendix C for the proof). Using this necessary condition, we can
easily filter out those probability distributions that cannot deliver
any utility improvement.
Theorem 4.5. The utility of R2DP with ϵ ≥ ln
[
E 1
b
(
eϵ (b)
) ]
is
always upper bounded by the utility of the ϵ-differentially private
baseline Laplace mechanism. Equivalently, for an R2DP mechanism
to boost the utility, the following relation is necessarily true.
eϵ =
E( 1b )
M ′1
b
(−∆q) < M 1b (∆q) (8)
We note that ϵ = ln
[
E 1
b
(
eϵ (b)
) ]
provides a tight upper bound
since it gives the overall eϵ of an R2DPmechanism as the average of
differential privacy leakage. Next, we examine a set of well-known
PDFs as second-fold distribution to identify the distribution that
offers a significantly improved utility compared with the bound
given in Theorem 4.5. Promisingly, our analytic evaluations for
three of these distributions, i.e., Gamma, uniform and truncated
Gaussian distributions demonstrate such a payoff (Appendix B
theoretically analyzes several case study PDFs). We note that those
chosen distributions are general enough to cover many of other
probability distributions (e.g., Exponential, Erlang, and Chi-squared
distributions are special cases of Gamma distribution).
4.2.3 Deriving Error Bounds. The error bounds of the R2DP mech-
anism under some well-known utility metrics are shown in Table 1.
The key idea in deriving these results is to calculate the mean of
each utility metric over the PDF of RV 1/b (which is the linear
combination of RVs in multiple PDFs). Specifically, given the error
bound eL(b) for deterministic variance (i.e., Laplace mechanism),
the total error bound of an R2DP mechanism will be the mean
∫ ∞
0 eL(b)fb (b)db. The results shown in Table 1 can be easily ap-
plied to optimize those metrics in corresponding applications (e.g.,
ℓ1 for private record matching [44], ℓ2 for location privacy [8], use-
fulness for machine learning [7], Mallows for social network analy-
sis [42], and relative entropy (with a degree α) for semi-supervised
learning [37]).
Table 1: Error bound of R2DP under different metrics
Metric Dependency to Prior R2DP Error Bound
ℓ1 independent
∞∫
0
M 1
b
(−x)dx
ℓ2 independent
√
2
∞∬
0
M 1
b
(−u)dudx
Usefulness independent 1 −M 1
b
(−γ )
Mallows (p) dependent
(
[∑ni=1 |Ni ∼ [−M ′1
b
(−x)/2]|p ]/n
)1/p
Relative Entropy (α) dependent log
∑n
x∈X p(x )αq(x )1−α
α−1 s.t(q(x) − p(x)) ∼ −M ′1
b
(−x)/2
In this context, the ℓ1, ℓ2 and usefulness metrics (as defined in
Section 2.3) are independent to the prior (i.e., not depending on the
distribution of the true results). The metrics will be evaluated based
on the deviation between the true and noisy results (which does
not change regardless of the prior). On the contrary, some other
metrics (e.g., Mallows and relative entropy) depend on the prior
distribution of the true results [37, 42]. In such cases, the metrics
will be evaluated based on the deviation between the true and noisy
results w.r.t. the prior in specific experimental settings (we will
discuss those specific priors used in the experiments in Section 5).
In addition to the error bounds given in Table 1, an analyst can
derive error bounds for more advanced queries, e.g., those pertain-
ing to learning algorithms [22, 47, 71, 84]. Given the error bound
of Laplace mechanism in an application (e.g., Linear SVM [47]), the
error bound of the R2DP framework for this application can be
derived by taking average of the Laplace’s result over the PDF of
1
br
. In particular, Table 2 demonstrates the error bounds of R2DP
for some learning algorithms (as shown in Section 5, those learning
algorithms can benefit from integrating R2DP instead of Laplace).
To derive the error bounds shown in Table 1 and Table 2, the
noise parameter(s) and the PDFs used in R2DP can be released to
a downstream analyst. This will not cause any privacy leakage
because, similar to other differential privacy mechanisms, the pri-
vacy protection of R2DP comes from the (first-fold) randomization
(whose generated random noises are never disclosed), which will
not be affected even if all the noise parameter(s) and the PDFs are
disclosed (see Section 4.1 and Appendix C for the formal privacy
analysis and proof). We note that, although R2DP replaces the fixed
variance of a standard differential privacy mechanism with a ran-
dom variance, this second-fold randomization is not meant to keep
the generated parameters (e.g., the variance) secret, but designed
to cover a larger search space (as detailed in Section 3.3).
4.3 R2DP Algorithm
Algorithm 1 details an instance of the R2DP framework using linear
combination of three different PDFs. In particular, the algorithm
with ϵ-DP finds the best second-fold distribution using the Lagrange
multiplier function (see Appendix D) that optimizes the utility
Table 2: R2DP compared to Laplace w.r.t. error bounds for learning algorithms
Linear SVM [47] Bayesian Inference (statistician) [84] Robust Linear Regression [22] Naive Bayes [71]
Laplace O( log(1/β )α 2 + 1ϵα +
log(1/β )
αϵ ) O(mn log(n))[1 − exp(− nϵ2 |I | ] O(n−ϵ loдn ) O( 1nϵ )
R2DP O( log(1/β )α 2 + E 1b (
b
α +
b log(1/β )
α )) O(mn log(n))[1 −M 1b (−
n
2 |I | )] O(E 1b (n
− loдnb )) O(E 1
b
(bn ))
metric. Then, it randomly generates the noise using the two-fold
distribution (e.g., first-fold Laplace) and injects it into the query.
Input :Dataset D , Privacy budget ϵ , Query q(·), Metric and its
parameters (from data recipient)
Output :Query result q(D) + Lap(br ), DP guarantee ϵ , Second-fold
PDF’s parameters
1 ∆q ← Sensitivity (q(·))
2 Find optimal parameters from Lagrange Multiplier L(ϵ, ∆q, metric) =
aopt1 , a
opt
2 , a
opt
3 , k
opt , θopt , aoptu , b
opt
u , µopt , σ opt , a
opt
NT , b
opt
NT
3 X1 ∼ Γ(kopt , θopt )
4 X2 ∼ U (aoptu , boptu )
5 X3 ∼ NT (µopt , σ opt , aoptNT , b
opt
NT )
6 1br = a
opt
1 · X1 + a
opt
2 · X2 + a
opt
3 · X3
7 return q(D) + Lap(br ), ϵ , L(ϵ, ∆q, metric)
Algorithm 1: The Ensemble R2DP Algorithm
Some advanced applications (e.g., workload queries) that inte-
grate R2DP to improve their utility are discussed in Appendix G.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATIONS
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the performance of
R2DP using six different utility metrics, i.e., ℓ1, ℓ2, entropy, useful-
ness, Mallows and Rényi divergence. Furthermore, we investigate
the tightness of R2DP under Rényi differential privacy (RDP in
short) [62] which provides a universal formulation of the privacy
losses of various DP mechanisms, as shown in Appendix F.2.2 (facil-
itating the comparison between different mechanisms). Our objec-
tive is to verify the following two properties about the performance
of the R2DP framework w.r.t. all seven utility and privacy metrics:
(1) R2DP produces near-optimal results and (2) R2DP performs
strictly better than well-known baseline mechanisms, e.g, Laplace
and Staircase mechanisms, in settings where an optimal PDF is not
known, e.g., usefulness utility metric or Rényi differential privacy .
5.1 Experimental Setting
We perform all the experiments and comparisons on the Privacy
Integrated Queries (PINQ) platform [61]. Besides basic statistical
queries, two applications in the current suite (machine learning and
social network analysis) are employed to evaluate the accuracy of
R2DP and compare it to Laplace and Staircase mechanisms.
5.1.1 Statistical Queries. In the first set of our experiments, we
examine the benefits of R2DP using basic statistical functions, i.e.,
count and average. The dataset comes from a sensor network exper-
iment carried out in the Mitsubishi Electric Research Laboratories
(MERL) and described in [77]. MERL has collected motion sensor
data from a network of over 200 sensors for a year and the dataset
contains over 30 million raw motion records. To illustrate the query
performance with different sensitivities, we create the queries based
on a subset of the data including aggregated events that are recorded
by closely located sensors over 5-minute intervals. We formed in
this way 10 input signals corresponding to 10 spatial zones (each
zone is covered by a group of sensors). Since each individual can ac-
tivate several sensors and travel through different zones, we define
moving average functions with arbitrary sensitivity values, e.g.,
∆q ∈ [0.1, 5]. For instance, we could be interested in the summation
of the moving averages over the past 30 min for zones 1 to 4. We
apply R2DP w.r.t. usefulness, ℓ1, ℓ2, entropy, and Rényi metrics,
respectively.
5.1.2 Social Network. Social network degree distribution is per-
formed on a Facebook dataset [55]. They consist of “circles” and
“friends lists” from Facebook by representing different individuals
as nodes (47,538 nodes) and friend connections as edges (222,887
edges). Recall that the Mallows metric is frequently used for social
network (graph-based) applications [49]. We thus apply R2DP w.r.t.
the Mallows metric in this group of experiments.
5.1.3 Machine Learning. Naive Bayes classification is performed
on two datasets: Adult dataset (in the UCI ML Repository) [51]
and KDDCup99 dataset [70]. First, the Adult dataset includes the
demographic information of 48,842 different adults in the US (14
features). It can be utilized to train a Naive Bayes classifier to predict
if any adult’s annual salary is greater than 50k or not. Second, the
KDD competition dataset was utilized to build a network intrusion
detector (given 24 training attack types) by classifying “bad” con-
nections and “good” connections. Recall that the usefulness metric
is commonly used for machine learning [7]. We thus apply R2DP
w.r.t. the usefulness in this group of experiments.
5.2 Basic Statistical Queries
We validate the effectiveness of R2DP using two basic statistical
queries: count (sensitivity=1) and moving average with different
window sizes, e.g., sensitivity ∈ [0.1, 2] to comprehensively study
the performance of R2DP by benchmarking with Laplace and Stair-
case mechanisms. We have the following observations.
5.2.1 UsefulnessMetric. We compare R2DPwith the baseline Laplace
and two classes of Staircase mechanisms proposed in [38] w.r.t. ℓ1
and ℓ2 metrics, by varying the privacy budget ϵ , four error bounds
γ ∈ {0.1, 0.4, 0.6, 0.9} and two different sensitivities (Section E addi-
tionally shows numerical results to provide a more comprehensive
evaluation for the usefulness metric). As shown in Figure 3, R2DP
generates strictly better results w.r.t. the usefulness metric, and the
ratio of improvement depends on values of ϵ , ∆q andγ . In particular,
we observe that the improvement is relatively larger for a larger
error bound and smaller sensitivity (Figure 3 (a,b,e,f) vs. (c,d,g,h)).
One important factor determining the improvement is the ratio
between γ and ∆q, since it exponentially affects the search space
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Figure 3: Usefulness metric: R2DP (with five PDFs, i.e., Gamma, Uniform, Truncated Gaussian, Noncentral Chi-squared and
Rayleigh distributions) strictly outperforms Laplace and Staircase mechanisms for statistical queries, where the ratio of im-
provement depends on the values of ∆q, γ and ϵ .
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Figure 4: ℓ1 and ℓ2 metrics: R2DP compared to Laplace and Staircase mechanisms for statistical queries (with five PDFs, i.e.,
Gamma, Uniform, Truncated Gaussian, Noncentral Chi-squared and Rayleigh distributions).
of the R2DP mechanism. Furthermore, we observe that the Laplace and the staircase mechanisms are not optimal (w.r.t. usefulness) for
very small and large values of ϵ , respectively, even though they are
known to be optimal under other utility metrics (e.g., [34]).
5.2.2 ℓ1 and ℓ2Metrics. We compare R2DPwith the baseline Laplace
and Staircase mechanisms [38], by varying the privacy budget ϵ
and for four different sensitivities ∆q ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 1, 1.5}. Our re-
sults validate the findings of Geng et al. [34], i.e., in the low privacy
regime (ϵ →∞), the Staircase mechanism is optimal while in the
high privacy regime (ϵ → 0), the Laplace mechanism is optimal.
More importantly, our evaluations show that, for medium regime
of privacy budgets (which could be more desirable in practice), the
class of optimal noise can be totally different. In fact, as shown
in Geng et al. [34], the lower-bound of ϵ at which the Staircase
distribution performs better than the Laplace distribution is some-
where around ϵ = 3 for both ℓ1 and ℓ2 metrics. As illustrated in
Figure 4, in contrast to ℓ1 metric (for which the results of laplace
and staircase are relatively tight), R2DP can find a class of noises
with significantly improved ℓ2 metric for ϵ < 3 (a logarithmic X
axis is used to illustrate the performance in this region). The PDF
of this class of noises is mostly two-fold distributions with Laplace
distribution as the first fold, and Gamma distribution as the second
fold. This finding is in line with the optimal class of noise proposed
by Koufogiannis et al. [52], i.e., f (v) = ϵ
nΓ(n2 + 1)
π
n
2 Γ(n + 1)
e−ϵ | |v | |2 . Fur-
thermore, our results suggest different classes of optimal noises
(than those found in the literature) for different parameters, sensi-
tivity, ϵ and p (index of ℓ norm). In particular, a larger p tends to
provide larger search spaces for R2DP optimization, which results
in further improved results for ϵ < 3 (Figure 4 (a,b,e,f) vs. (c,d,g,h)).
5.2.3 Relative Entropy Metric. As Wang et al [75] has already
shown that the output entropy of ϵ-DP randomization mechanisms
is lower bounded by 1− ln(ϵ/2) (for count queries) and the optimal
result is achieved with Laplace mechanism, we focus our entropy
metric evaluation on relative entropy metrics, i.e., KL and Rényi
divergences. To define the prior distribution for this group of ex-
periments, we have created a histogram with 50 bins of our data
and calculated the probability mass function (pmf) of the bins. 1 As
illustrated in Figure 5, we can draw similar observations for the KL
entropy metric. In particular, we observe that R2DP performs better
for smaller sensitivity due to the larger search space of PDFs used
in optimization. Similarly the Rényi entropy depicted in Figure 6
shows a similar trend with different α (the index of the divergence).
Summary. The R2DP mechanism can generate better results than
most of the well-known distributions for utility metrics without
known optimal distributions (e.g., usefulness), and our results asymp-
totically approach to the optimal for utility metrics with known
optimal distributions (e.g., ℓ1 and ℓ2). In particular, even though
R2DP is not specifically designed to optimize ℓ1 and ℓ2 metrics,
we observe very similar performance between the R2DP results
and the optimal Staircase results, e.g., the multiplicative gain com-
pared to the Laplace results. We note that using a larger number
12 millions records fall into 50 bins (e.g., equal range for each bin). Then, any counting
and moving average query (with different sensitivities) can be performed within each
of the 50 bins to generate the distribution. Finally, the distance between the original
and noisy distributions can be measured using the relative entropy metrics.
of independent RVs drawn from different PDFs as the search space
generator may further improve the results.
5.3 Tightness of R2DP under Rényi DP
Rényi differential privacy [62] is a recently proposed as a relaxed
notion of DP which effectively quantifies the bad outcomes in (ϵ,δ )-
DP mechanisms and consequently evaluates how such mechanisms
behave under sequential compositions (see Appendix F.2.2 for de-
tails on Rényi DP). We now evaluate how the privacy loss of R2DP
behaves under Rényi DP.
Specifically, this group of experiments are conducted to pro-
vide insights about the privacy loss of R2DP and other well-known
mechanisms. In particular, Figure 7 (a-d) depicts the Rényi differen-
tial privacy of the R2DP and two basic mechanisms for counting
queries: random response and Laplace mechanisms. These results
are based on the privacy guarantees depicted in Table 3. Our results
demonstrate that fine tuning R2DP can generate strictly more pri-
vate results compared to the other two ϵ-DP mechanisms when the
definition of the privacy notion is relaxed. Furthermore, the level
of such tightness depends on the Rényi differential privacy index
where a smaller value of α pertains to a relatively tighter R2DP
mechanism. On the other hand, all three mechanisms behave more
similarly as α increases. Ultimately, at α →∞, where Rényi differ-
ential privacy becomes equivalent to the classic notion of ϵ-DP, all
three mechanisms’ privacy guarantees converge to ϵ .
Table 3: Summary of Rényi DP parameters for four mecha-
nisms based on Theorem F.4
Mechanism Differential Privacy Rényi Differential Privacy for α
Laplace 1b
α > 1 : 1α−1 log
[
α ·exp( α−1b )+(α−1)·exp( −αb )
2α−1
]
α = 1 : 1b + exp(−1b ) − 1
Random Response | log p1−p |
α > 1 : 1α−1 log
[
pα (1 − p)1−α + p1−α (1 − p)α ]
α = 1 : (2p − 1) log p1−p
R2DP M ′1
b
(0)/M ′1
b
(−1) α > 1 : 1α−1 log
[ αM 1
b
(α−1)+(α−1)M 1
b
(−α )
2α−1
]
α = 1 : M ′1
b
(0) +M 1
b
(−1) − 1
Gaussian ∞ α
2σ 2
In the next set of experiments, we compare the R2DP mecha-
nism and Gaussian mechanism in terms of privacy guarantee to
understand how exactly the bad outcomes probability (δ ) affects the
privacy robustness of a privatized mechanism. Figure 7 (e-h) gives
such a comparison. Specifically, since Rényi differential privacy at
each α can be seen as higher-order moments as a way of bounding
the tails of the privacy loss variable [62], we observe that each
value of α reveals a snapshot of such a privacy loss. As a tangible
observation, we conclude that the class of optimal ϵ-differential
privacy mechanisms benefits from a very smaller privacy loss at
smaller moments (which are more decisive in overall protection)
and larger privacy loss at bigger moments.
5.4 Social Network Analysis
We conduct experiments to compare the performance of R2DP,
Laplace and two staircase mechanisms based on PINQ queries in
social network analysis. Figure 8 compares the degree distribution
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Figure 5: KL Divergence (Relative entropy metric): R2DP (with five PDFs, i.e., Gamma, Uniform, Truncated Gaussian, Noncen-
tral Chi-squared and Rayleigh distributions) compared to Laplace and Staircase mechanisms.
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Figure 6: Rényi Divergence (Relative entropy metric): R2DP (with five PDFs, i.e., Gamma, Uniform, Truncated Gaussian, Non-
central Chi-squared and Rayleigh distributions) compared to Laplace and Staircase mechanisms.
for a real Facebook dataset using Mallows metric (the prior, i.e.,n =
47, 538 nodes, andp = 1 or 2 for computing the distribution distance
using Mallows metric). Again, our results confirm that R2DP can
effectively generate PDFs to maximize this utility metric suitable
for social networking analysis. Note that, since the definition of this
metric is similar to ℓp metric (Mallows is more empirical, depending
on the number of nodes in the dataset), the results for this metric
display a similar pattern to those for ℓp metric depicted in Figure 4.
5.5 Machine Learning
We obtain our baseline results by applying the Naive Bayes clas-
sifier on the Adult dataset (45K training records and 5K testing
records), the precision and recall results are derived as 0.814 and
0.825, respectively. Then, we evaluate the precision and recall of
R2DP and Laplace-based naive classification [72] by varying the
privacy budget for each PINQ query ϵ ∈ [0.1, 10] (sensitivity=1)
where two different error bounds γ = 0.05, 0.1 are specified for
R2DP. We have the following observations:
• As shown in Figure 9(a) and 9(b), the R2DP-based classifica-
tion is more accurate than the Laplace and staircase mecha-
nisms with the same total privacy budget for all the PINQ
queries ϵ . As the privacy budget ϵ increases, following our
statistical query experiments, R2DP offers a far better pre-
cision/recall compared to the Laplace-based classification
(close to the results without privacy consideration) since it
approaches to the optimal PDF.
• Among the precision/recall results derived with two different
γ in R2DP-based classification, for each ϵ , one out of the two
specified error bounds (e.g., γ = 5%) may reach the highest
accuracy (not necessarily the result with the smaller γ ).
• As shown in Figure 9(c) and 9(d), we can draw similar obser-
vations from the KDDCup99 dataset.
The above experimental results have validated the effectiveness
of integrating R2DP to improve the output utility for classification
while ensuring ϵ-differential privacy. In summary, all the experi-
ments conducted in both statistical queries and real-world applica-
tions have validated the practicality of the R2DP framework.
6 RELATEDWORK
Differential privacy [23] is a model for preserving privacy while
releasing the results of various useful functions, such as contingency
tables, histograms and means [20]. Many existing works focus on
improving the utility based on different mechanisms.
Noise Perturbation. Based on the general utility maximization
framework from Ghosh et al. [35], Gupte and Sundararajan [38]
further study the optimal noise probability distributions for single
count queries. Later, Geng el al. [32, 33] demonstrate the optimal
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Figure 7: Rényi Differential Privacy: (a-d) R2DP compared to Laplace and Random Response mechanisms, and (e-h) R2DP
compared to Gaussian mechanism.
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Figure 8: Mallows metric: R2DP compared to Laplace and Staircase mechanisms for degree distribution (Facebook dataset).
noise distribution has a Staircase-shaped PDF for Laplace mecha-
nism. Furthermore, Balle andWang [4] develop an optimal Gaussian
mechanism in high privacy regime to minimize the noise and in-
crease the utility for queries. Geng et al. [31] further show the
optimal noise distribution is a uniform distribution over Gaussian
mechanism. Moreover, Hardt et al. [41] study the privacy-utility
trade-off for answering a set of linear queries over a histogram,
where the error is defined as the worst expectation of the ℓ2-norm
(identical to variance) of the noise among all possible outputs. Sub-
sequently, Brenner et al. [10] show that, for general query functions,
no universally optimal DP mechanisms exist.
Sampling and Aggregation. Sampling and aggregation frame-
works mostly split the database into chunks, and aggregate the
result using a DP algorithm after querying each chunk [64]. To
expand the applicability of output perturbation, Nissim et al. [64]
propose a framework to formally analyze the effect of instance-
based noise. Observing the highly compressible nature of many
real-life data, researchers propose lossy compression techniques to
add noise calibrated to the compressed data. Acs et al. [3] propose
an optimization of Fourier perturbation algorithm that clusters and
exploits the redundancy between bins. Instead of directly adding
noise to histogram counts, it first lossily compresses the data, then
adds noise calibrated to the data. Li et al. [56] propose an algorithm
to partitions a data domain into uniform regions and adapts the
strategy to fit the specific set of range queries to achieve a lower
error rate. Zhang et al. [83] improve the clustering mechanism by
sorting histogram bins based on the noisy counts.
1 4 7 10
Privacy Budget ε (Log)
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
Pr
ec
isi
on
Baseline
R2DP, γ=0.05
R2DP, γ=0.1
Staircase
Laplace
(a) Precision vs. ϵ (UCI Adult)
1 4 7 10
Privacy Budget ε (Log)
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
Re
ca
ll
Baseline
R2DP, γ=0.05
R2DP, γ=0.1
Staircase
Laplace
(b) Recall vs. ϵ (UCI Adult)
1 4 7 10
Privacy Budget ε (Log)
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Pr
ec
isi
on
Baseline
R2DP, γ=0.05
R2DP, γ=0.1
Staircase
Laplace
(c) Precision vs. ϵ (KDDCup99)
1 4 7 10
Privacy Budget ε (Log)
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Re
ca
ll
Baseline
R2DP, γ=0.05
R2DP, γ=0.1
Staircase
Laplace
(d) Recall vs. ϵ (KDDCup99)
Figure 9: Accuracy evaluation for classification (UCI Adult dataset and KDDCup99 dataset)
Data Composition. Barak et al. [5] propose transforming the data
into the Fouier domain, which could avoid the violation of con-
sistency for low-order marginals in database tables. As efficiency
is the main bottleneck for this approach when the number of at-
tributes is large, Hay et al. [43] ensure that the error rate does
not grow with the size of a database. The proposed hierarchical
histogram method also achieves a lower error for a fixed domain.
Different from one-dimensional datasets solution proposed by Hay
et al. [43], Xiao et al. [79] propose Privelet that improves accuracy
on datasets with arbitrary dimensions, which could reduce error to
25% compared to 70% as baseline error rate. Cormode et al. [18] ap-
ply quadtrees and kd-trees as new techniques for parameter setting
to improve the accuracy on spatial data. Ding et al. [19] introduce a
general noise-control framework on data cubes. Li et al. [58] unify
the two range queries over histograms into one framework. Other
techniques, such as principal component analysis (PCA), linear
discriminant analysis (LDA) [48], and random projection [15, 80]
are also used to lower the data dimension for reducing the errors.
Cormode et al. [18] apply quadtrees (data-independent) and kd-trees
(data-dependent) to add noise to a histogram output.
Adaptive Queries. In this technique, the improvement of utilities
takes advantage of a known set of queries, for example, Dwork
et al. [27] propose Boosting for Queries algorithm to obtain a bet-
ter accuracy of learning algorithms. Hardt et al. [39, 40] present
multiplicative weights mechanism to improve the efficiency of in-
teractive queries. Instead of polynomial running time [25], this
work achieves a nearly linear running time with a relaxed utility re-
quirement. Yuan et al. [81, 82] propose low-rank mechanism (LRM)
to further improve the adaptive queries. Other techniques such as
correlated noise [63] and sparse vector technique (SVT) [60] are
also used in adaptive queries.
Applications. Many researchers also work on improving the util-
ity for different types of data, such as, the Fourier Perturbation
Algorithm (FPAk ) [67] in time-series data (e.g., location traces, web
history, and personal health), kd-trees on spatial data [18], and
matrix-valued query [14].
Summary. Our R2DP framework provides a complementary ap-
proach to those existing works by providing the opportunity of
searching for the maximal utility along an extra dimension. This
framework also enables data recipients to specify their utility re-
quirements and the computed parameter could be incorporated
into existing solutions to further improve utility.
7 CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed the R2DP framework as a universal solu-
tion for optimizing a variety of utility metrics requested in different
applications. It can automatically identify a distribution that yields
near-optimal utility, and hence is more practical for emerging ap-
plications. Specifically, we have shown that a differentially private
mechanism could be defined based on a random variable which
is itself distributed according to some parameterized distributions.
We have also shown that such a mechanism could explicitly take
into account both the privacy requirements and the utility require-
ments specified by the data owner and data recipient, respectively.
We have formally analyzed the privacy guarantee of R2DP based
on the well-known Laplace mechanism and formally proved the
improvement of utility over the baseline Laplace mechanism. Fur-
thermore, we discuss the potential of applying R2DP to advanced
algorithms. Finally, our experimental results based on six different
utility metrics for statistical queries, machine learning and social
network, as well as one privacy metric, have demonstrated that
R2DP could significantly improve the utility of differentially private
solutions for a wide range of applications.
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APPENDIX
A DEMONSTRATION OF THEOREM 3.1
A Laplace distribution is of a (∝ x · ex ·t ) order, where x is the
inverse of the scale parameter. Second, since x · ex ·t = de
x ·t
dt , the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) resulted from randomizing
x can be expressed in terms of the expectation E(ex ·t ). We note that
from now on, wewill simply refer to R2DPwith Laplace distribution
as the first fold PDF as the R2DP mechanism.
∈ 𝑆
{ 𝒑
𝟐𝒃𝟏
𝒆
−
𝒒 𝑫 +𝝎
𝒃𝟏 + 
𝟏−𝒑
𝟐𝒃𝟐
𝒆
−
𝒒 𝑫 +𝝎
𝒃𝟐 } × ቊ1 𝑖𝑓 𝑞 𝐷 + 𝜔 ∈ 𝑆
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑞 𝐷 + 𝜔 ∉ 𝑆
𝑏1
𝑏21-p
p
X ~ Bernouli(p)PX(x)
𝑃 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 ∈ S =
S ∈ ℝ
Figure 10: The term in the parenthesis is the derivative of
E(e 1b ·− |w |)w.r.t. −|w |, and hence the above probability can be
expressed in terms of the expectation
Example A.1. Following Example 3.1, for a Bernoulli distributed
scale parameter b, Figure 10 illustrates the above finding (see Appen-
dix C for proof). It can be verified that the term inside the braces is the
derivative of E(e 1b ·− |w |) w.r.t. −|w |, and hence the above probability
can be expressed in terms of the expectation.
B CASE STUDY PDFS
B.0.1 Discrete Probability Distributions. First, we consider two
different mixture Laplace distributions that can be applied for con-
structing R2DP with discrete probability distribution fb .
(1) Degenerate distribution. A degenerate distribution is a
probability distribution in a (discrete or continuous) space with
support only in a space of lower dimension [9]. If the degenerate
distribution is uni-variate (involving only a single random variable),
it will be a deterministic distribution and takes only a single value.
Therefore, the degenerate distribution is identical to the baseline
Laplace mechanism as it also assigns the mechanism one single
scale parameter b0. Specifically, the probability mass function of
the uni-variate degenerate distribution is:
fδ,k0 (x) =
{
1 x = k0
0 x , k0
The MGF for the degenerate distribution δk0 is given by Mk (t) =
et ·k0 [12]. Using Equation 4, Theorem B.1 gives the same DP guar-
antee as the baseline Laplace mechanism.
Theorem B.1. The R2DP mechanism Mq (d, ϵ), ϵ ∼ fδ, 1b0 (ϵ), is
∆q
b0
-differentially private.
Obviously, this distribution does not improve the bound in The-
orem 4.5 but shows the soundness of our findings.
(2) Bernoulli distribution. The probability mass function of
this distribution, over possible outcomes k , is
fB (k ;p) =
{
p if k = 1,
1 − p if k = 0.
Note that the binary outcomes k = 0 and k = 1 can be mapped to
any two outcomes X0 and X1, respectively. Therefore, we consider
the following Bernoulli outcomes
fB,X0,X1 (X ;p) =
{
p if X = X1,
1 − p if X = X0.
The MGF for Bernoulli distribution fB,X0,X1 (X ;p) is MX (t) = p ·
et ·X0 + (1 − p) · et ·X1 [12]. We now derive the precise differential
privacy guarantee of an R2DP mechanism with its scale parameter
randomized according to a Bernoulli distribution.
Theorem B.2. The R2DPmechanismMq (d, ϵ), ϵ ∼ fB, 1b0 , 1b1 (ϵ ;p),
satisfies ln[p · e
∆q
b0 + (1 − p) · e
∆q
b1 ] differential privacy.
This bound is exactly the mean of eϵ (b) given in Theorem 4.5.
B.0.2 Continuous Probability Distributions. We now investigate
three compound Laplace distributions.
(1) Gamma distribution. The gamma distribution is a two-
parameter family of continuous probability distributions with a
shape parameter k > 0 and a scale parameter θ . Besides the gener-
ality, the gamma distribution is the maximum entropy probability
distribution (both w.r.t. a uniform base measure and w.r.t. a 1/x
base measure) for a random variable X for which E(X ) = kθ = α/β
is fixed and greater than zero, and E[ln(X )] = ψ (k) + ln(θ ) =
ψ (α) − ln(β) is fixed (ψ is the digamma function). Therefore, it may
provide a relatively higher privacy-utility trade-off in comparison
to the other candidates [45, 50]. A random variableX that is gamma-
distributed with shape α and rate β is denoted by X ∼ Γ(k,θ ) and
the corresponding PDF is
fΓ(X ;k,θ )= x
k−1e−
x
θ
Γ(k) · θk for X > 0 and k,θ > 0,
where Γ(α) is the gamma function. We now investigate the differen-
tial privacy guarantee provided by assuming that the reciprocal of
the scale parameterb in Laplace mechanism is distributed according
to the gamma distribution (see Appendix C for the proof).
Theorem B.3. The R2DP mechanism Mq (d, ϵ), ϵ ∼ fΓ(ϵ ;k,θ ),
satisfies
((k + 1) · ln(1 + ∆q · θ )) differential privacy.
We now apply the necessary condition given in Equation 8 (see
Appendix C for the proof).
Lemma B.4. R2DP using Gamma distribution can satisfy the nec-
essary condition in Equation 8.
Therefore, Gamma distribution may improve over the baseline,
and this can be computed by optimizing the privacy-utility trade-
off using the Lagrange multiplier function in Equation 6. Also, our
numerical results show that, this distribution is more effective for
large ϵ (weaker privacy guarantees).
(2) Uniform distribution. In probability theory and statistics,
the continuous uniform distribution or rectangular distribution is
a family of symmetric probability distributions such that for each
member of the family, all intervals of the same length on the support
of the distribution are equally probable. The support is defined by
the two parameters, a and b, which are the minimum and maximum
values. The distribution is often abbreviated as U (a,b), which is
the maximum entropy probability distribution for a random vari-
able X under no constraint; other than that, it is contained in the
distribution’s support [45, 50]. The MGF forU (a,b) is
MX (t) =
{
e tb−e ta
t (b−a) for t , 0,
1 for for t = 0.
Using Theorem 4.1, we now drive the precise differential privacy
guarantee of an R2DP mechanism for uniform distributionU (a,b).
Theorem B.5. The R2DP mechanismMq (d, ϵ), ϵ ∼ fU (a,b)(ϵ), is
ln
[ α 2−β 2
2((1+β )e−β−(1+α )e−α )
]
-differentially private, where α = a · ∆q
and β = b · ∆q.
We now apply the necessary condition given in Equation 8. One
can easily verify that the inequality holds for an infinite number of
settings, e.g., a = 0.5, b = 9 and ∆q = 1.2.
Lemma B.6. R2DP using uniform distribution can satisfy the nec-
essary condition in Equation 8.
Therefore, R2DP using uniform distribution may improve over
the baseline, and this can be computed by optimizing the privacy-
utility trade-off using the Lagrange multiplier function in Equa-
tion 6. Also, our numerical results show that, this distribution can
also be effective for both small and large ϵ .
(3) Truncated Gaussian distribution. The last distribution we
consider is the Truncated Gaussian distribution. This distribution
is derived from that of a normally distributed random variable by
bounding the random variable from either below or above (or both).
Therefore, we can benefit from the numerous useful properties
of Gaussian distribution, by truncating the negative region of the
Gaussian distribution. Suppose X ∼ N(µ,σ 2) has a Gaussian dis-
tribution and lies within the interval X ∈ (a,b), −∞ ≤ a < b ≤ ∞.
Then, X conditional on a < X < b has a truncated Gaussian distri-
bution with the following probability density function
fNT (X ; µ,σ ,a,b)=
ϕ(X−µσ )
σ · (Φ(b−µσ ) − Φ(a−µσ )) for a ≤ x ≤ b
and by fNT = 0 otherwise. Here, ϕ(x) = 1√2π ·e
− x22 and Φ(x) =
1−Q(x) are PDF and CDF of the standard Gaussian distribution, re-
spectively. Next, using Theorem 4.1, we give the differential privacy
guarantee provided by the mechanism assuming that the reciprocal
of b is distributed according to the truncated Gaussian distribution.
TheoremB.7. The R2DPmechanismMq (d, ϵ), ϵ ∼ fNT (ϵ ; µ,σ ,a,b),
satisfies ϵNT - differential privacy, where
ϵNT = ln

µ +
σ · (ϕ(α) − ϕ(β))
(Φ(β) − Φ(α))
dMNT (t)
dt |t = −∆q

(9)
in whichϕ(·) is the probability density function of the standard normal
distribution, ϕ(·) is its cumulative distribution function and α = a−µσ
and β = b−µσ .
Lemma B.8 (see Appendix C for the proof). R2DP using trun-
cated Gaussian distribution can satisfy the necessary condition in
Equation 8.
Therefore, truncated Gaussian distributionmay improve over the
baseline, and this can be computed by optimizing the privacy-utility
trade-off using the Lagrange multiplier function in Equation 6. In
particular, our numerical results show that, this distribution can
also be effective for smaller ϵ (stronger privacy guarantees).
C PROOFS
Example A.1. Following Example 3.1, for a Bernoulli distributed
scale parameter b, we have
P(Mq (d,b) ∈ S)
=
∫
R
p
2b1
· 1S {q(d) +w}e
−|w |
b1 +
1 − p
2b2
· 1S {q(d) +w}e
−|w |
b2 dw
=
∫
R
( p
2b1
· e
−|w |
b1 +
1 − p
2b2
· e
−|w |
b2
)
1S {q(d) +w}dw
where 1{·} denotes the indicator function. It can be verified that
the term in the braces is the derivative of E(e 1b ·− |w |) w.r.t. −|w |,
and hence the above probability can be expressed in terms of the
expectation. □
Theorem 3.1. For an R2DP Laplace mechanism and ∀S ⊂ R
measurable and dataset d in D, we have
P(Mq (d,b) ∈ S)
=
∫
R≥0
f (b) 12b
∫
R
1S {q(d) +w}e
−|w |
b dw db
=
∫
R≥0
д(u)u2
∫
R
1S {q(d) +w}e−|w | ·u dw du
=
∫
R
1S {q(d) +w}
∫
R≥0
д(u)u2 e
−|w | ·u du dw
=
∫
R
1S {q(d) +w} 12
dMu (t)
dt
|t=−|w | dw
= 12
∫
S
dMu (t)
dt
|t=−|x−q(d ) |dx (10)
= 12 ·
[
−Mu (−|x − q(d)|)|S≥q(d ) +Mu (−|x − q(d)|)|S<q(d )
]
(11)
where u = b−1, is reciprocal of random variable b and д(u) =
1
u2 · f ( 1u ). Note thatMu (t) is the MGF of random variable u which
is identical withM 1
b
(t). □
Theorem 4.1. To prove this theorem, we first need to give two
lemmas on the properties of R2DP Laplace mechanism and MGFs.
Lemma C.1. The R2DP mechanismMq (d,b), is
ln

max∀x ∈R

dM 1
b
(t)
dt |t=−|x−q(d ) |
dM 1
b
(t)
dt |t=−|x−q(d ′) |


-differentially private. (12)
Proof. According to Equation 10,
P(Mq (d,b) ∈ S) = 12
∫
S
dM 1
b
(t)
dt |t=−|x−q(d ) |dx
= 12
∫
S
dM 1
b
(t)
dt |t=−|x−q(d ) |
dM 1
b
(t)
dt |t=−|x−q(d ′) |
·
dM 1
b
(t)
dt |t=−|x−q(d ′) |dx
Denote by
eϵ = sup

dM 1
b
(t)
dt |t=−|x−q(d ) |
dM 1
b
(t)
dt |t=−|x−q(d ′) |
,∀x ∈ S

,
⇒ P(Mq (d,b) ∈ S) ≤ eϵ · P(Mq (d ′,b) ∈ S)
and the choice of S = R concludes the proof. □
Next, we show the log-convexity property of the first derivative
of moment generating functions.
Lemma C.2. First derivative of a moment generating function
defined by
dM(t)
dt = E(z · e
zt ) is log-convex.
Proof. For real- or complex-valued random variables X and Y ,
Hölder’s inequality [1] reads; E(|XY |) ≤ (E(|X |)p )1/p · (E(|Y |)q )1/q
for any 1 < p,q < ∞ with 1/p + 1/q = 1. Next, for all θ ∈ (0, 1)
and 0 ≤ x1,x2 < ∞, define X = zθ · eθx1z , Y = z1−θ · e(1−θ )x2z and
p = 1/θ , q = 1/(1 − θ ). Therefore, we have
E(z · e(θx1+(1−θ )x2z ) ≤ E(z · ex1z )θ · E(z · ex2z )1−θ
which shows the definition of log-convexity holds forM ′(t). □
Back to the original proof, following theDP guarantee in LemmaC.1,
and using triangle inequality, we have
eϵ = max∀x ∈R
{
E(ϵ ·e (−|x−q(d )|·ϵ ))
E(ϵ ·e (−|x−q(d′)|·ϵ ))
}
≤ max∀t ∈R≤0
{
E(ϵ ·e (t ·ϵ ))
E(ϵ ·e ((t−∆q)·ϵ ))
}
Next, we show that f (t) = E(ϵ ·e (t ·ϵ ))
E(ϵ ·e ((t−∆q)·ϵ )) is non-decreasing w.r.t. t .
For this purpose, we must show that
f ′(t) = M
′′(t) ·M ′(t − ∆q) −M ′(t) ·M ′′(t − ∆q)
M ′2(t − ∆q)
is non-negative. However, this is equivalent to show that M
′′(t )
M ′(t ) ≥
M ′′(t−∆q)
M ′(t−∆q) or more generally
M ′′(t )
M ′(t ) is not-decreasing. However, fol-
lowing the log-convexity of firstM ′(t), the logarithmic derivative
of M ′(t) denoted by M ′′(t )M ′(t ) is non-decreasing. Thus, for all t < 0,
f (t) ≤ f (0), and evaluating eϵ (t ) at t = 0, concludes our proof. □
Theorem 4.5. Following Theorem 2.2, an ϵ-DP Laplace mech-
anism is (γ , e
−γ
b(ϵ ) )-useful for all γ ≥ 0, where b(ϵ) = ∆qϵ . There-
fore, for the usefulness of the baseline Laplace mechanism at ϵ =
ln[E 1
b
(eϵ (b))], we have
e
−γ ·ln[E 1
b
(eϵ (b))]
∆q =
(
E 1
b
(eϵ (b))) −γ∆q = (E 1
b
(e ∆qb )) −γ∆q ≤ E 1
b
(
e
−γ
b
)
where the last inequality relation is verified by Jensen inequal-
ity [46] as д(x) = x −γb is a convex function. Recall the following
Jensen inequality: Let (Ω,F, P) be a probability space, X an inte-
grable real-valued random variable and д a convex function. Then
д(E(X )) ≤ E(д(X ))
Therefore,
1 − e
−γ ·ln[E 1
b
(eϵ (b))]
∆q ≥ 1 − E 1
b
(
e
−γ
b
)
= U (ln[E 1
b
(eϵ (b))],∆q,γ )
This completes the proof. □
Theorem B.1. For 1b ∼ fδ, 1b0 (
1
b ), the MGF is given byM 1b (t) =
e
t
b0 . Following Theorem C.1, one can write
eϵ = max∀x ∈R

1
b0
·e
−|x−q(d )|
b0
1
b0
·e
−|x−q(d′)|
b0
 = max∀x ∈R
{
e
|x−q(d′)|−|x−q(d )|
b0
}
≤ max∀x ∈R
{
e
|q(d )−q(d′)|
b0
}
= e
∆q
b0
where the last inequality is from triangle inequality.
□
Theorem B.2. The R2DP Laplace mechanism Mq (d,b), 1b ∼
fB, 1b0 ,
1
b1
( 1b ;p) returns with probability p, a Laplace mechanism
with scale parameter b1, and with probability 1−p another Laplace
mechanism with scale parameter b2. To this end, we are looking for
eϵ = max∀x ∈R

p
b0
·e
−|x−q(d )|
b0 + 1−pb1 ·e
−|x−q(d )|
b1
p
b0
·e
−|x−q(d′)|
b0 + 1−pb1 ·e
−|x−q(d′)|
b1

Therefore, using triangle inequality, we have
eϵ1 = max∀S ∈R
{
p ·e
−|x−q(d )|
b0 +(1−p)·e
−|x−q(d )|
b1
p ·e
−|x−q(d′)|
b0 +(1−p)·e
−|x−q(d′)|
b1
}
≤ max
∀x ≥q(d )
 p ·e
∆q−|x−q(d′)|
b0 +(1−p)·e
∆q+−|x−q(d′)|
b1
p ·e
−|x−q(d′)|
b0 +(1−p)·e
−|x−q(d′)|
b1

Let us make the substitutionsX = e
−|x−q(d′)|
b0 , a = e
∆q
b0 and k=b0b1 > 1.
Hence, we have
eϵ ≤ max
∀X ∈(0,1)
{
p ·a ·X+(1−p)·(a ·X )k
p ·X+(1−p)·X k
}
To obtain eϵ , we need to find all the critical points of eϵ1 (X ) =
p ·a ·X+(1−p)·(a ·X )k
p ·X+(1−p)·X k . However, the critical points of a fractional func-
tion are the roots of the numerator of its derivative. Hence, suppose
deϵ (X )
dX =
N (X )
D(X )
then
⇒ N (X ) = (p · a + (1 − p) · k · a · (a · X )k−1)
· (p · X + (1 − p) · Xk ) − (p + (1 − p) · k · Xk−1)
· (p · a · X + (1 − p) · (a · X )k )
= p · (1 − p) · (k − 1) · (ak−1 − 1) · Xk
However, all the terms in the last expression are strictly positive.
Therefore, the only critical points are X = 0 and X = 1 and as the
function is strictly increasing,
eϵ ≤ eϵ (1) = p · a + (1 − p) · (a)k
= p · e
∆q
b0 + (1 − p) · e
∆q
b1
which is the bound in the Theorem. □
Theorem B.3. For a Gamma distribution with shape parameters
k and scale parameters θ , the MGF at point t is given as (1−θ · t)−k .
Since 1b ∼ fΓ( 1b ;k,θ ), following Theorem C.1, one can write
eϵ = max∀x ∈R
{
k ·θ ·(1+θ · |x−q(d ) |)−k−1
k ·θ ·(1+θ · |x−q(d ′) |)−k−1
}
⇒ ϵ = max∀x ∈R
{
(k + 1) · ln
[ (1+θ · |x−q(d ′) |)
(1+θ · |x−q(d ) |)
]}
to find the maximum of the ln term, denote byX = 1+θ · |x −q(d)|).
Moreover, since |x − q(d ′)| ≤ |x − q(d)| + ∆q, we have
⇒ ϵ ≤ max∀X ≥1
{
X + ∆q · θ
X
}
However, since
∀X ≥ 1, X + ∆q · θ
X
is strictly decreasing, we have
⇒ ϵ = (k + 1) · ln [1 + θ · ∆q]
This completes the proof. □
Lemma B.4. We need to show that there exist k and θ such that
(k + 1) · ln(1+∆q · θ ) < −k · ln(1−∆q · θ ) , θ < 1∆q . Given θ = 12∆q ,
we need to show that ∃k,k · ln(2) > (k + 1) · ln(1.5), which always
holds for all k > 1.4094. □
Lemma B.8. Using exhaustive search, suppose µ = 0.5223,σ =
1.5454, a = 0.5223 and for ϵ = 1.1703 and ∆q = 0.6, we will get
ln(MNT (∆q)) = 1.2417. □
D LAGRANGE MULTIPLIER FUNCTION
The Lagrange Multiplier Function (all possible linear combinations
of the Gamma, uniform and truncated Gaussian distributions) is:
L(a1,a2,a3,k,θ ,au ,bu , µ,σ ,aNT ,bNT ,Λ) (13)
= MΓ(k,θ )(−a1γ ) ·MU (au ,bu )(−a2γ )
·MNT (µ,σ ,aNT ,bNT )(−a3γ ) + Λ · (ln
[
N
D
]
− ϵ)
where the numerator and the denominator N, D are
N =
(a1 · k · θ ) + (a2 · a+b2 ) + (a3 · (µ + (
σ · ϕ(α) − ϕ(β))
(Φ(β) − Φ(α)) ))
D = a1 ·M ′Γ(k,θ )(−a1 · ∆q) ·MU (au ,bu )(−a2 · ∆q)
·MNT (µ,σ ,aNT ,bNT )(−a3 · ∆q)
+a2 ·MΓ(k,θ )(−a1 · ∆q) ·M ′U (au ,bu )(−a2 · ∆q)
·MNT (µ,σ ,aNT ,bNT )(−a3 · ∆q)
+a3 ·MΓ(k,θ )(−a1 · ∆q) ·MU (au ,bu )(−a2 · ∆q)
·M ′NT (µ,σ ,aNT ,bNT )(−a3 · ∆q)
E NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
We also demonstrate the effectiveness of R2DP through numerical
results based on Algorithm 1 (the ensemble R2DP algorithm). In
particular, Figure 11 depicts the corresponding usefulness (the prob-
ability of the results to be within a pre-specified error bound) of the
R2DP, the Laplace and the Staircase mechanisms. Figure 11 clearly
demonstrates the fact that the R2DP mechanism can significantly
improve both already considered to be competing mechanisms.
In particular, we observe the power of the R2DP mechanism in
generating very high utility results, e.g., results with more than
0.8 probability fallen inside only γ = 0.1 error-bound, owing to
automatically searching a large search space of PDFs.
F R2DP AND OTHER DP MECHANISMS
In this section we briefly discuss the application of the R2DP frame-
work in two other well-known baseline DP mechanisms.
F.1 R2DP Exponential Mechanism
The exponential mechanism was designed for situations in which
we wish to choose the âĂĲbestâĂİ response but adding noise di-
rectly to the computed quantity can completely destroy its value,
such as setting a price in an auction, where the goal is to max-
imize revenue, and adding a small amount of positive noise to
the optimal price (in order to protect the privacy of a bid) could
dramatically reduce the resulting revenue [26]. The exponential
mechanism is the natural building block for answering queries
with arbitrary utilities (and arbitrary non-numeric range), while
preserving differential privacy. Given some arbitrary range R, the
exponential mechanism is defined with respect to some utility func-
tion u : N |X | ×R → R, which maps database/output pairs to utility
scores. Intuitively, for a fixed database x , the user prefers that the
mechanism outputs some element of R with the maximum possible
utility score. Note that when we talk about the sensitivity of the
utility score u : N |X | × R → R, we care only about the sensitivity
of u with respect to its database argument; it can be arbitrarily
sensitive in its range argument:
∆u ≡ max
r ∈R
max
x,y :∥x−y ∥≤1
|u(x , r ) − u(y, r )|.
The intuition behind the exponential mechanism is to output each
possible r ∈ R with probability proportional to exp(ϵu(x , r )/∆u)
and so the privacy loss is approximately:
ln
(exp(ϵu(x , r )/∆u)
exp(ϵu(y, r )/∆u)
)
= ϵ[u(x , r ) − u(y, r )/∆u] ≤ ϵ (14)
The exponential mechanism is a canonical ϵ-DP mechanism,
meaning that it describes a class of mechanisms that includes all
possible differentially private mechanisms. However, the exponen-
tial mechanism can define a complex distribution over a large ar-
bitrary domain, and so it may not be possible to implement the
exponential mechanism efficiently when the range of u is super-
polynomially large in the natural parameters of the problem [26].
This is the main restrictive aspect of the exponential mechanism
against leveraging different accuracy metrics. However, the expo-
nential mechanism can benefit from the additional randomization
of privacy budget, to handle the complexity (excessive sharpness) of
the defined probability distribution. In particular, as we mentioned
earlier, compound (or mixture) distributions arise naturally where
a statistical population contains two or more sub-population which
is the case for the exponential mechanism. Thus, we motivate the
application of the R2DP framework in designing exponential mech-
anisms with rather smooth but accurate distributions around each
element in the range of u. However, further discussion on R2DP
exponential mechanism requires formal analysis, e.g., deriving the
DP guarantee of such a mechanism.
F.2 R2DP and Differential Privacy Relaxations
R2DP can also be studied under various relaxations of differen-
tial privacy, e.g., (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy or Rényi Differential
Figure 11: The R2DP mechanism significantly outperforms the competing Laplace and the staircase mechanisms in maximiz-
ing the usefulness metric (an example of a utility metric with no known optimal PDF).
Privacy [62] which is a privacy notion based on the Rényi diver-
gence [73]. These relaxations allow suppressing the long tails of the
mechanism’s distribution where pure ϵ-differential privacy guar-
antees may not hold. Instead, they offer asymptotically smaller
cumulative loss under composition and allow greater flexibility in
the selection of privacy preserving mechanisms [62]. In the fol-
lowing, we briefly discuss the application of R2DP in two of such
relaxed notions of the differential privacy .
F.2.1 R2DP Gaussian Mechanism. A relaxation of ϵ-differential
privacy allows an additional bound δ in its defining inequality:
Definition F.1 ((ϵ,δ )-differential privacy [21]). A random-
ized mechanismM : D × Ω → R is (ϵ,δ )-differentially private if for
all adjacent d,d ′ ∈ D, we have
P(M(d) ∈ S) ≤ eϵP(M(d ′) ∈ S) + δ , ∀S ⊂ R. (15)
This definition quantifies the allowed deviation (δ ) for the output
distribution of a ϵ-differentially private mechanism, when a sin-
gle individual is added or removed from a dataset. A differentially
private mechanism proposed in [21] modifies an answer to a numer-
ical query by adding the independent and identically distributed
zero-mean Gaussian noise.
Given the definition of the Q-function Q(x) := 1√
2π
∫ ∞
x e
−u22 du,
we have the following theorem [21, 53].
Theorem F.1. Let q : D → R be a query and ϵ > 0. Then the
Laplace mechanismMq : D×Ω → R defined byMq (d) = q(d)+w ,
withw ∼ N (0,σ 2) , where σ ≥ ∆q2ϵ (K +√K2 + 2ϵ) and K = Q−1(δ ),
satisfies (ϵ,δ )-DP.
We define κδ,ϵ = 12ϵ (K +
√
K2 + 2ϵ), then the standard deviation
σ in Theorem F.1 can be written as σ (δ , ϵ) = κδ,ϵ∆q. It can be
shown that κδ,ϵ behaves roughly as O(ln(1/δ ))1/2/ϵ . For example,
to ensure (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy with ϵ = ln(2) and δ = 0.05, the
standard deviation of the injected Gaussian noise should be about
2.65 times the ℓ1-sensitivity of q.
Theorem F.2. The Gaussian Mechanism in Theorem F.1 is (γ , 2 ·
Q ( γσ (δ,ϵ ) ))-useful.
Similar to our R2DP Laplace mechanism, we can formulate an op-
timization problem for the R2DP model using Gaussian mechanism.
Therefore, using Theorems F.1 and F.2, we have the following.
Corollary F.3. Denote byu, the set of parameters for a probability
distribution fσ . Then, the optimal usefulness of an R2DP Gaussian
mechanism utilizing fσ , at each quadruplet (ϵ,δ ,∆q,γ ) is
Uf (ϵ,δ ,∆q,γ ) = max
u ∈R|u |
(
1 − 2 · Eσ (Q
( γ
σ (δ,ϵ )
) ))
subject to (16)
max∀S ∈R
{
P(Mq (d,σ )∈S )
P(Mq (d ′,σ )∈S )
}
= ϵ,
Eσ (Q(ϵσ − 12σ )) = δ
F.2.2 R2DP and Rényi Differential Privacy. Despite its notable ad-
vantages in numerous applications, the definition of (ϵ,δ )-differential
privacy has the following two limitations.
First, (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy was applied to the analysis of the
Gaussian mechanism [21]. In contrast to the Laplace mechanism
(whose privacy guarantee is characterized tightly and accurately
by ϵ-differential privacy), a single Gaussian mechanism satisfies a
curve of (ϵ(δ ),δ )-differential privacy definitions [21]. Picking any
one point on this curve may leave out important information about
the mechanism’s actual behavior [62].
Second, (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy also has limitations on the
composition of differential privacy [61]. By relaxing the guarantee
to (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy, advanced composition allows tighter
analyses for compositions of (pure) differentially private mecha-
nisms. Iterating this process, however, quickly leads to a combina-
torial explosion of parameters, as each application of an advanced
composition theorem leads to a wide selection of possibilities for
(ϵ(δ ),δ )-differentially private guarantees.
To address these shortcomings, Rényi differential privacy was
proposed as a natural relaxation of differential privacy in [62].
Definition F.2 ((α , ϵ)-RDP). A randomized mechanismM : D ×
Ω → R is said to have ϵ-Rényi differential privacy of order α , or
(α , ϵ)-RDP for short, if for if for all adjacent d,d ′ ∈ D, we have
Dα (M(d)| |M(d ′)) ≤ ϵ , where Dα (·) is the (parameterized) Rényi
divergence [73].
Compared to (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy, Rényi differential privacy
is a strictly stronger privacy definition. It offers an operationally
convenient and quantitatively accurate way of tracking cumulative
privacy loss throughout execution of a standalone differentially
private mechanism and across many such mechanisms [62]. Next,
we give the Rényi differential privacy guarantee of our R2DP mech-
anism and show that the privacy loss of R2DP under Rényi DP
can significantly (asymptotically for small α ) outperform Laplace,
Gaussian and Random Response mechanisms.
Theorem F.4. If real-valued query q has sensitivity 1, then the
R2DP mechanismMq , leveraging MGFM , satisfies{
(α , 1α−1 log
[
αM (α−1)+(α−1)M (−α )
2α−1
]
)-RDP. i f α > 1
(1,M ′(0) +M(−1) − 1)-RDP. i f α = 1
Proof. The above RDP guarantee follows Corollary 2 in [62] on
the RDP guarantee of the classic Laplace mechanism. In particular,
the above equations are derived using the following substitutions
exp(t/b) → M(t) and 1/b → M ′(0) due to the second-fold random-
ization of b. □
G OTHER APPLICATIONS OF R2DP
R2DP represents a very general concept which could potentially be
applied in a broader range of contexts. In general, applying R2DP to
design more application-aware mechanisms may further improve
the utility of many existing solutions [64]. We now briefly discuss
some of the potential applications as follows.
R2DP and Query-Workload Answering [59]. Given a workload
(aka. a batch of queries), the matrix mechanism generates a different
set of queries, called strategy queries, which are answered using a
standard Laplace or Gaussian mechanism. The noisy answers to
the workload queries can then be derived from the noisy answers
to the strategy queries [57]. This two-stage process can result in a
correlated noise distribution that preserves differential privacy and
also increases utility.
Given a triplet (ϵ , query, metric), R2DP can be applied to replace
the Laplace or Gaussian mechanism for answering the strategy
queries of the matrix mechanism. As a result, R2DP will provide
additional improvement in utility (in terms of the TotalError as
defined in [57]) over the improvement already provided by the ma-
trix mechanism. More specifically, we compare the total errors of
Laplace and R2DP mechanisms in Table 4 for specific workloads of
interest (similar to those considered in [57]). These two workloads
were analyzed in [57] using two n-sized query strategies, each of
which can be envisioned as a recursive partitioning of the domain
based on the Haar wavelet [78]. We denote by f (ϵ,∆q) the im-
provement in the TotalError for applying an R2DP noise instead of
a Laplace noise in the matrix mechanism. For instance, leveraging
the results of R2DP (w.r.t. ℓ1 or ℓ2) shown in Section 5.2.2, for a
workload of size n = 6, at ϵ = 2.3, the improvement for range
queries (∆q = 36) and predicate queries (∆q = 64) are ∼20% and
∼10%, respectively.
Table 4: Total error ofmatrixmechanisms comparison (with
R2DP vs. Laplace) – two workloads and two query strategies
TotalError Matrix Strategies
Mechanisms Workload Queries Binary Hierarchy of Sums Matrix of the Haar Wavelet
Laplace Range Queries Θ(n
2 log3(n)/ϵ2) Θ(n2 log3(n)/ϵ2)
Predicate Queries Θ(n2n log2(n)/ϵ2) Θ(n2n log2(n)/ϵ2)
R2DP Range Queries Θ(f (ϵ,n
2)n2 log3(n)/ϵ2) Θ(f (ϵ,n2)n2ϵ2 log3(n))
Predicate Queries Θ(f (ϵ, 2n )n2n log2(n)/ϵ2) Θ(f (ϵ, 2n )n2n log2(n)/ϵ2)
R2DP and Composition. R2DP may be applied for reducing the
privacy leakage due to sequential or parallel querying over a dataset,
of which the objective will be to maximize the number of composi-
tions under a specified ϵ-differential privacy constraint.
R2DP and Local Differential Privacy. In this context, R2DP can
be regarded as a new randomized response model. In particular, the
randomized response scheme presented in [76] can be produced
using R2DP for the Bernoulli distribution when b0 → 0 and b1 →
∞. Therefore, designing more efficient local differential privacy
schemes using R2DP is an interesting future direction.
R2DP for Continual Observation Applications. Providing dif-
ferential privacy guarantees on data streams represents another
important future direction for R2DP. As an example, the multi-input
multi-output (MIMO) systems process streams of signals originated
from many sensors capturing privacy-sensitive events about indi-
viduals, and statistics of interest need to be continuously published
in real time [24, 53], e.g., privacy-preserving traffic monitoring over
multi-lane roads [11]. In this context, R2DP can leverage the con-
straint related to the number of inputs and the number of outputs
(e.g., the sensitivity of the output of MIMO filter G withm inputs
and p outputs is proportional to theH2 norm of G which itself is
an increasing function ofm and p [65]) into its model to build more
efficient differentially private mechanisms for the MIMO scenarios.
